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Quantum digital signature (QDS) is an approach to guarantee the nonrepudiation, unforgeability and transfer-
ability of a signature with the information-theoretical security. All previous experimental realizations of QDS
relied on an unrealistic assumption of secure channels and the longest distance is only several kilometers. Here,
we have experimentally demonstrated a recently proposed QDS protocol without any secure channel. Exploiting
the decoy state modulation, we have successfully signed one bit message through up to 102 km optical fiber.
Furthermore, we continuously run the system to sign the longer message “USTC” with 32 bit at the distance of
51 km. Our results pave the way towards the practical application of QDS.
Digital signature [1] is a basic primitive for plenty of cryp-
tographic protocols, which has many applications in software
distribution, financial transactions, contract management soft-
ware and so on. Classical digital signature mainly exploits the
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) protocol [2], whose security
is based on the mathematical complexity of integer factoriza-
tion problem. This, however, may become vulnerable with a
quantum computer [3]. By exploiting the laws of quantum
mechanics, quantum key distribution (QKD) can offer two
legitimate users to share the random key with information-
theoretical security [4, 5]. Similarly, one can expect to exploit
the laws of quantum mechanics to sign a message with the
information-theoretical security, which is called quantum dig-
ital signature (QDS).
A basic digital signature model will introduce at least three
authorized parties, in addition, the three authorized parties
cannot be assumed all honest. By contrast, a conventional
QKD system has two authorized and honest parties. This is
why QKD has entered practical application and networking
deployment [6], while the QDS is still on the stage of the secu-
rity analysis and the proof-of-principle experimental demon-
stration.
The first QDS protocol was proposed by Gottesman and
Chuang in 2001 [7], where several technical challenges need
to be fixed for a practical implementation, including nonde-
structive state comparison, long time quantum memory and
secure quantum channel. Thereafter, QDS has attracted a
great deal of interest in the literature. Various QDS protocols
have been proposed [8–12] and some pioneering experimen-
tal efforts have been made towards this direction [13–16]. To
name a few, Clarke et al. [13] utilize coherent states and lin-
ear optics to avoid the nondestructive operation and provides
the first experimental try. Collins et al. [14] present a realiza-
tion without the need of quantum memory, which, however,
still needs the assumption of secure quantum channel. Secure
quantum channel means that the quantum channel should not
be tampered. Note that the basic model of quantum communi-
cation such as QKD [4, 5] and quantum secret sharing [17] is
that the quantum channel can be eavesdropped and tampered
with. Therefore, the secure quantum channel is an unrealis-
tic assumption and limits the application of QDS. Meanwhile,
the Mach-Zehnder interferometer configuration in the exper-
iment by Collins et al. [14] requires phase stability between
distant parties, which is experimentally challenging for a long
distance implementation.
Very recently, new QDS protocols [18, 19] have been pro-
posed to remove the assumption of secure quantum channel.
A kilometer range demonstration for the new protocols is pro-
vided [15], which however introduces another assumption of
secure classical channel. In this Letter, we provide a complete
QDS experiment without quantum or classical secure chan-
nel assumption over 102 km optical fiber. We do believe that
with these experimental advances, QDS with information-
theoretical security will come to practical applications soon.
Before describing the experiment in detail, we first intro-
duce the QDS protocol [18] used in this work. In a digital sig-
nature protocol, Alice, the sender, will send a message with
a digital signature to two recipients, Bob and Charlie. With-
out loss of generality, we take Bob as the authenticator. He
then forwards the information that he received from Alice, to
Charlie. In a successful digital signature protocol, Alice could
not deny the signature, which is called nonrepudiation. On the
other hand, Bob could not forge the message, which is called
unforgeability. If Bob accepts the message, Charlie will also
accepts the message, which is called transferability.
Our protocol is divided into two steps, quantum stage and
signature stage. In the quantum stage, for each future possi-
ble message m = 0, 1, Alice exploits weak coherent states
(WCS) to randomly prepare two identical qubit states from
the BB84 states [20], |H〉, |V 〉, |+〉 and |−〉, where |H〉, |V 〉
represent horizontal and vertical polarization states, |+〉 =
(1/
√
2)(|H〉 + |V 〉) and |−〉 = (1/√2)(|H〉 − |V 〉). In or-
2FIG. 1: Experimental setup for quantum digital signature. Alice randomly prepares two copies of BB84 states with decoy-state method and
sends to Bob and Charlie through two fiber spools, respectively. Bob and Charlie detect the photon with their SNSPDs (superconducting
nanowire single-photon detector). PBS: polarization beam splitter, pi
4
RBS: pi/4 rotation beam splitter, EVOA: electrical variable optical
attenuator, DWDM: dense wavelength division multiplexer, BS: beam splitter, EPC: electric polarization controller, FPGA: filed programmable
gate array, SynL: synchronization laser.
der to avoid photon-number splitting attack, Alice exploits the
decoy-state method by randomly varying the intensity of the
pulses. She chooses three intensities µ, ν, ω, one as signal and
two as decoy states. Then, Alice randomly sends one qubit
state with intensity of α to Bob and the other with intensity
of β to Charlie, where, (α, β) ∈ (µ, ν, ω). Note that, the po-
larization states for Bob and Charlie are identical, while the
intensities are not necessary to be the same.
Bob and Charlie independently and randomly exploit Z or
X basis to measure the received quantum state. Alice, Bob
and Charlie record the corresponding data when both Bob’s
and Charlie’s detectors have a click. The nonorthogonal state
encoding scheme [21] are used to identify the conclusive out-
come and inconclusive outcome. For each quantum state,
Bob (Charlie) compares his measurement outcomes with two
nonorthogonal states announced by Alice. If his measurement
outcome is orthogonal to one of Alice’s announced states, he
concludes a conclusive result that the other state has been sent.
Otherwise, he concludes that it is an inconclusive outcome,
which is only known by himself.
Then, the signature process starts. Alice announces the nine
intensity sets and also the bit information of six intensity sets,
µω, ωµ, νν, νω, ων and ωω. Charlie, as the verifier, estimates
the yield, Y C11 and the quantum bit error rate eC11 for single-
photon pairs of his conclusive results [18], where a single-
photon pair represents that one photon is sent to Bob and one
photon is sent to Charlie. Exploiting the entanglement distil-
lation technique [18, 22, 23], the min-entropy of Bob about
Charlie’s conclusive results with the single-photon pairs can
be bounded by 1 − H(eCp11|eC11), where eCp11 is the phase er-
ror rate and H(eCp11|eC11) is the conditional Shannon entropy
(see the Supplemental Material for details). Given the bound
of the min-entropy of Bob, one can acquire the lower bound
of mismatching rate S11 between Bob’s declaration and Char-
lie’s conclusive results with single-photon pairs, which can be
given by [18, 19],
1−H(eCp11|eC11)−H(S11) = 0, (1)
whereH(x) = −x log2 x−(1−x) log2(1−x) is the Shannon
entropy function. Exploiting the mismatching rate S11, one
can restrict the forgery attack of Bob.
On the other hand, the data string under the case of three
intensity sets µµ, µν, νµ constitute an overall data string.
Charlie randomly chooses some data from the overall data
string as the sampling data string and informs to Alice and
Bob. They compare the bit value for the sampling string and
estimate the quantum bit error rate of conclusive results, EBs
and ECs , which are utilized to restrict repudiation from Alice.
The remaining data string of Alice, Bob and Charlie are kept
for the digital signature, denoted as SAm, SBm and SCm, re-
spectively.
3TABLE 1: The error rates and secure thresholds at different distances in our experiment. Thereinto, εrep (εfor) represents the probability of
successful repudiation (forgery) attack. N represents the total pulse pairs sent by Alice to sign half bit.
Distance 25 km 51 km 76 km 102 km
Attenuation 4.9 dB 9.8 dB 14.8 dB 19.8 dB
Tv 2.0% 2.0% 1.9% 2.2%
Ta 0.6% 0.6% 0.55% 0.7%
Message m=0 m=1 m=0 m=1 m=0 m=1 m=0 m=1
EBs 0.35% 0.39% 0.37% 0.37% 0.36% 0.29% 0.51% 0.45%
ECs 0.26% 0.29% 0.25% 0.22% 0.30% 0.26% 0.42% 0.40%
S11 4.33% 4.21% 4.27% 4.35% 4.28% 4.10% 4.46% 4.42%
Time 20s 20s 180s 180s 1620s 1620s 33420s 33420s
N 1.5× 109 1.5× 109 1.35 × 1010 1.35 × 1010 1.215 × 1011 1.215 × 1011 2.5065 × 1012 2.5065 × 1012
εrep 7.1 × 10
−10
1.4× 10−6 1.6× 10−10 3.4 × 10−11 5.3× 10−8 4.9× 10−12 4.9 × 10−8 5.7× 10−13
εfor 7.4 × 10
−15
5.6× 10−9 4.1× 10−13 4.1 × 10−12 2.5× 10−8 3.7 × 10−9 1.4× 10−19 7.0× 10−10
εrob 8.2 × 10
−12
3.9× 10−8 1.6× 10−9 4.6 × 10−10 1.2× 10−7 1.2× 10−14 2.2 × 10−9 2.0× 10−18
From the view of Alice, the status of all data (conclusive re-
sults and inconclusive results) owned by Bob (Charlie) could
be regarded as the same, since Bob (Charlie) do not announce
the position of conclusive result. By random sampling, the
upper bound of the difference between the data owned by Bob
and Charlie can be bounded. With this restrict, Alice, has to
send almost the same quantum states to Bob and Charlie and
thus the potential repudiating attack is avoided. Taking into
account the finite-size effect [24–27], the authentication (ver-
ification) security threshold Ta (Tv) can be determined. With
Ta and Tv, one can calculate the probabilities of successful re-
pudiation attack, forgery attack and the robustness. Detailed
analysis can be found in the Supplemental Material.
To sign one-bit message m, Alice sends the message and
the corresponding data string (m,SAm) to the authenticator
Bob. Bob will accept the message when the mismatching rate
of his conclusive outcome is less than Ta. If Bob accepts the
message, he forwards (m,SAm) to the verifier, Charlie. Char-
lie will accept the message when the mismatching rate of his
conclusive outcome is less than Tv.
In the implementation, the quantum stage setup is shown
in Fig. 1. Alice prepares four polarization-encoded BB84
states with four electrically modulated distributed feedback
laser diodes. The emissions of the laser diodes are centered
at 1550 nm with a pulse duration of 0.4 ns and repetition fre-
quency of 75 MHz. The difference of the central wavelength
from these lasers is well controlled to be less than 0.02 nm
via temperature control. We combine the four laser diodes
with two PBS and one 45 degree RBS into a single fiber. An
electrical variable optical attenuator (EVOA) is used to atten-
uate the average photon number per pulse to the experimental
level. The dense wavelength division multiplexer (DWDM)
with 100 GHz bandwidth is used to filter any spurious emis-
sion. After the filtration, the quantum states are sent out to
Bob through a fiber spool.
We exploit the decoy-state method [28–30] by varying the
injection electrical current for the laser diodes. We set the in-
tensities of signal states µ = 0.22, decoy states ν = 0.066
and vacuum states ω = 0 and their corresponding probability
distributions are Pµ = 65%, Pν = 35% and Pω = 5%, re-
spectively. All random signals for choosing polarization states
or intensities are all derived from random numbers generated
beforehand. Meanwhile, the phases for the directly modulated
laser diode are random, which is immune to the unambiguous
state discrimination attack [31].
In Bob’s side, the detector system contains four supercon-
ducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPD) that pro-
vide the detection efficiency of 52% at the dark count rate of
10 counts per second. A polarization measurement module is
connected to the detector system via single-mode fibers and
consists of one beam splitter (BS), two electric polarization
controllers (EPC) and two PBS. The EPCs are used for com-
pensation of the polarization fluctuation in the fiber spool. The
optical pulses go through the polarization measurement mod-
ule to be detected by the SNSPD. The insertion loss of the
polarization measurement module is around 1.2 dB.
Bob exploits a crystal oscillator circuit to generate 500 kHz
electric signals as the synchronization signals of system. Bob
sends synchronization laser pulses (SLP) at 1570 nm modu-
lated by the 500 KHz electric signals to Alice through an ad-
ditional fiber. A photoelectric detector (PD) and phase-locked
loop utilized by Alice detect the SLP and regenerate a system
clock frequency of 75 MHz by frequency multiplication as the
clock for her four laser diodes. Alice exploits the same setup
to send quantum states to Charlie.
In our experiment, we perform a symmetrical case that each
fiber length from Alice to Bob and Alice to Charlie are almost
the same. The length of fiber spool are 25 km, 51 km, 76
km and 102 km, respectively. For each distance, we send two
groups of quantum states to sign one future bit message in the
signature stage, where the first group is used to sign future
message bit m = 0 and the second group for bit m = 1. All
the parameter estimation and the message signature are imple-
mented in a local area network connecting the three users.
4The bit error rates EBs and ECs of Bob’s and Charlie’s con-
clusive results in the sampling data string are listed in Ta-
ble 2. Exploiting the decoy-state method [18], the yield and
quantum bit error rate of single-photon pairs can be acquired.
The lower bound of the mismatching rate S11 can be calcu-
lated using Eq. (2) which is shown in Table 2. Given that
the security bound is εsec < 10−5 and the robustness bound
is εrob < 10−6, the authentication and verification security
thresholds Ta and Tv can be chosen with proper values, which
are also shown in Table 2. More details of experimental results
can be found in the Supplemental Material.
FIG. 2: The error rates and the mismatching rates for each group.
The experimental error rates EBs (ECs ) of Bob’s (Charlie’s) conclu-
sive results in the sampling data string are almost 0.3%–0.4% (0.2%–
0.3%). The mismatching rate S11 calculated by Eq. (2) are almost
4.2%–5.0%
Except for proof-of-principle demonstration of a one-bit
QDS like all previous experimental demonstrations, we also
implement QDS for a longer message. We continuously col-
lect 64 groups and each group has 180 seconds at the distance
of 51 km. The bit error rates of Bob’s and Charlie’s conclu-
sive results EBs and ECs in the sampling data string for each
group are shown in Fig. 2. We set the security bound to be
εsec < 10
−5 and the robustness bound to be εrob < 10−6 for
each group. For simplicity, the authentication and verification
security thresholds Ta and Tv can be fixed to be 2.0% and
0.6%, respectively. Note that the secure thresholds can be dif-
ferent for each group. We can sign 32 bit message since two
groups need to be used to sign one bit message. Before Alice
signs the long message, she will publicly announce the length
of the message bits. Here, we have successfully signed a 32-
bit message “USTC”. The process of signing the message can
be found in Fig. 3.
In summary, we have experimentally demonstrated a QDS
protocol without the assumption of any secure channel. Ex-
ploiting the decoy state modulation and the BB84 state en-
coding, we have successfully signed one bit message through
up to 102 km optical fiber. Furthermore, we continuously run
the system to sign the longer message “USTC” with 32 bits
FIG. 3: Demonstration of signing the message string
“USTC”. Alice sends the ASCII code for the message
“01010101010100110101010001000011” and the corresponding
data string S1A0S2A1 · · ·S31A1S32A1 to Bob through the authenticated
classical channel. Bob compares the data string S1A0S2A1 · · ·S31A1S32A1
and S1B0S2B1 · · ·S31B1S32B1, and accepts the message since the error
rates of Bob’s conclusive rates is less than Ta for each group. Bob
forwards the message and the corresponding data string to Charlie
through the authenticated classical channel. Charlie compares the
data string S1A0S2A1 · · ·S31A1S32A1 and S1C0S2C1 · · ·S31C1S32C1, and
accepts the message since the error rates of Charlie’s conclusive
rates is less than Tv for each group.
at the distance of 51 km. We remark that it needs 360 sec-
onds to sign one bit message at the distance of 51 km, which
currently seems to be not so practical. However, if we im-
plement the full parameter optimization and joint constrained
statistical fluctuation [32], combined with the six-state encod-
ing [18], the signature rate will increase obviously with more
than two orders of magnitude.
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DECOY STATE SCHEME AND FINITE-SIZE EFFECT
In this section, we will review the probability of repudiation and forgery attack calculations for the quantum digital signa-
ture (QDS) protocol. No one can unambiguously discriminate two copies of quantum states from the four polarization states
|H〉 , |V 〉 , |+〉 , |−〉. For the two-photon components, the min-entropy of Bob about Charlie’s conclusive results acquired by
the nonorthogonal state encoding scheme [21] can be quantified by the entanglement distillation technique [18, 22, 23]. The
relationship between phase error rate ep and the bit error rate eb is given by
ep = min
x
{xeb + f(x)} , ∀x, 2−
√
2
4
eb ≤ a ≤ 2 +
√
2
4
eb, (2)
and
f(x) =
3− 2x+
√
6− 6√2x+ 4x2
6
, (3)
where a is the probability that both bit flip and phase shift occur, which quantifies the mutual information between phase and bit
errors. The conditional Shannon entropy function can be given by [18]
H(ep|eb) = − (1 + a− eb − ep) log2
1 + a− eb − ep
1− eb − (ep − a) log2
ep − a
1− eb − (eb − a) log2
eb − a
eb
− a log2
a
eb
. (4)
The intensity set αβ represents that Alice sends weak coherent state pulses to Bob with intensity α and weak coherent state
pulses to Charlie with intensity β. Alice prepares the phase randomized weak coherent state pulse pairs in Z basis or X basis
with the intensity sets of µµ, µν, νµ, µ0, 0µ, νν, ν0, 0ν, 00. In the photon number space, the density matrix for a pulse pair of
intensity αβ can be given by
ραβ =
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
e−α
αn
n!
e−β
βm
m!
|n〉 〈n| |m〉 〈m|. (5)
The effective detection event can be defined as that both Bob and Charlie have a detection click. We denote Nαβ as the number
of pulses sent by Alice with the intensity set αβ. Mαβ is the number of effective detection events. MBαβ (MCαβ) is the number of
6effective detection events given that Bob (Charlie) has the conclusive results. The gain QCαβ is the ratio of MCαβ to Nαβ . ECαβ is
the quantum bit error rate in MCαβ events.
Denote Y C11 (eC11) as the yield (bit error rate) of Alice sending single-photon pairs and Charlie having conclusive results.
Exploiting the decoy-state method [18], the lower bound of yield Y C11 and the upper bound of eC11 with analytic form can be
written as
Y C11 ≥
1
µ2ν2(µ− ν) ×
{
µ3
[
e2νQCνν − eν
(
QCν0 +Q
C
0ν
)]− ν3[e2µQCµµ − eµ(QCµ0 +QC0µ)]+ (µ3 − ν3)QC00} (6)
and
eC11 ≤
1
ν2Y C11
[
e2νECννQ
C
νν − eν
(
ECν0Q
C
ν0 + E
C
0νQ
C
0ν
)
+ EC00Q
C
00
]
. (7)
We exploit the standard error analysis method [24] to calculate the finite-size effect of decoy state estimation. Thus, we have
QCUµν = Q
C
µν

1 + γ√
NµνQCµν

 , QCLµν = QCµν

1− γ√
NµνQCµν

 . (8)
where γ is the number of standard deviations, and
ǫ′ =
1√
2π
∫ ∞
γ
e−
t
2
2 dt, (9)
where ǫ′ is the failure probability for each estimation.
The data string of µ0, 0µ, νν, ν0, 0ν and 00 are all announced publicly to estimate the bit error rate of single-photon pairs
in Eq. (7). Therefore, the data string under the case of three intensity sets µµ, µν and νµ constitutes an overall data string M ,
i.e., M = Mµµ +Mµν +Mνµ. Similarly, MC = MCµµ +MCµν +MCνµ and MB = MBµµ +MBµν +MBνµ are the numbers of
Bob’s and Charlie’s conclusive results in the overall data string M , respectively. We denote Ms to be the sampling data string,
Mr = M − Ms to be the rest data string, MBs and MCs to be the numbers of Bob’s and Charlie’s conclusive results in the
sampling data stringMs, MBr = MB−MBs and MCr = MC−MCs to be the numbers of Bob’s and Charlie’s conclusive results
in the rest data string Mt. We denote EBs and ECs to be the quantum bit error rates in MBs and MCs , respectively.
From the view of Bob and Charlie, only the conclusive results can be used to detect the error (mismatching), while the
inconclusive results can only be assumed without mismatching. The mismatching rates of Bob’s and Charlie’s in the sampling
data string can be given by
∆Bs = E
B
s M
B
s /Ms, ∆
C
s = E
C
s M
C
s /Ms. (10)
However, from the view of Alice, the status of all data owned by Bob (Charlie) in the data string M could be regarded as
the same, since Bob (Charlie) does not announce the position of conclusive results. By using the random sampling without
replacement [25], the upper bound of the difference between the data owned by Bob and by Charlie in the rest data string can be
given by
∆ = ∆s + δ, ∆s = ∆
B
s +∆
C
s , δ = g[Ms,Mr,∆s, ǫ], (11)
where ǫ = 10−6 is the failure probability and
g(n, k, λ, ǫ) =
√
2(n+ k)λ(1 − λ)
nk
ln
√
n+ kC(n, k, λ)√
2πnkλ(1− λ)ǫ ,
C(n, k, λ) =exp
( 1
8(n+ k)
+
1
12k
− 1
12kλ+ 1
− 1
12k(1− λ) + 1
)
.
(12)
By using the Chernoff Bound [26, 27], the optimal probability of Alice’s repudiation attack can be written as [18]
εrep = exp
[
− (A−M
B
r Ta/Mr)
2
2A
Mr
]
, (13)
7where A is the physical solution of the following equation and inequalities,
(A−MBr Ta/Mr)2
2A
=
[
MCr Tv/Mr − (A+∆)
]2
3(A+∆)
,
MBr Ta/Mr < A < (M
C
r Tv/Mr −∆).
(14)
The number of the single-photon pairs of Charlie’s conclusive results in the rest data string can be given by
MC11r = (Mr/M)(Nµµe
−2µµ2 +Nµνe−µ−νµν +Nνµe−µ−νµν)Y C11 . (15)
We assume that Bob can guess the information of Charlie’s conclusive results without error unless the single-photon pairs. The
lower bound of mismatching rate S11 between Bob’s declaration and Charlie’s conclusive results with single-photon pairs can
be given by
1−H(eCp11|eC11)−H(S11) = 0, (16)
where H(x) = −x log2 x− (1−x) log2(1−x) is the Shannon entropy function, the phase error rate eCp11 of single-photon pairs
can be calculated by Eq. (2) and a = 2−
√
2
4 . The optimal probability of Bob’s forgery attack is [18]
εfor = exp
[
− (S11 − Tv11)
2
2S11
MCr11
]
, (17)
where Tv11 = TvMCr /MCr11 is the error rate threshold of single-photon pairs of Charlie’s conclusive results. The secure bound
of the protocol can be written as
εsec = εfor + εrep + ǫ+ 11ǫ
′. (18)
where 11ǫ′ = 7× 10−6 is the failure probability due to the decoy-state method.
The probability of the robustness is [18]
εrob = h[Mr,Ms,∆
B
s ,M
B
r Ta/Mr −∆Bs ]. (19)
where
h(n, k, λ, t) =
exp[− nkt22(n+k)λ(1−λ) ]C(n, k, λ)√
2πnkλ(1− λ)/(n+ k) .
(20)
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have performed the QDS experiment in the laboratory. The distances form Alice to Bob (Alice to Charlie) are performed
with four cases, i.e., 25 km, 51 km, 76 km and 102 km fiber spools. Therefore, the maximum distances between Bob and
Charlie can be about 50 km, 102 km, 152 km, 204 km. The secure parameters and important results at different distances in
the experiment are shown in Table 2. Tables 3-6 show the details of the total pulses Nαβ , the total counts Mαβ , MBαβ , MCαβ ,
the error rates EBαβ and ECαβ . From the experimental results, we can see that the probabilities of Bob’s and Charlie’s conclusive
results are all approximately 0.25 and in accordance with the theory. Table 7 shows the case of the random sampling with the
probability of 30%.
8TABLE 2: The secure parameters at different distances in the experiment.
Distance 25km 51km 76km 102km
Attenuation 4.9dB 9.8dB 14.8dB 19.8dB
Tv 2.0% 2.0% 1.9% 2.2%
Ta 0.6% 0.6% 0.55% 0.7%
Message m=0 m=1 m=0 m=1 m=0 m=1 m=0 m=1
Total pulse 1.5× 109 1.5× 109 1.35 × 1010 1.35 × 1010 1.215 × 1011 1.215 × 1011 2.5065 × 1012 2.5065 × 1012
Time 20s 20s 180s 180s 1620s 1620s 33420s 33420s
eC11 1.12% 1.20% 1.16% 1.10% 1.15% 1.29% 1.03% 1.05%
Y C11 2.74× 10
−3
2.55× 10−3 3.20× 10−4 3.09× 10−4 3.29 × 10−5 3.42× 10−5 3.42× 10−6 3.48 × 10−6
S11 4.33% 4.21% 4.27% 4.35% 4.28% 4.10% 4.46% 4.42%
εrep 7.1× 10
−10
1.4× 10−6 1.6× 10−10 3.4× 10−11 5.3× 10−8 4.9× 10−12 4.9× 10−8 5.7× 10−13
εfor 7.4× 10
−15
5.6× 10−9 4.1× 10−13 4.1× 10−12 2.5× 10−8 3.7× 10−9 1.4× 10−19 7.0× 10−10
εrob 8.2× 10
−12
3.9× 10−8 1.6× 10−9 4.6× 10−10 1.2× 10−7 1.2× 10−14 2.2× 10−9 2.0× 10−18
TABLE 3: List of the total pulses, the total counts and the error counts in the case of 25 km in the laboratory.
25km m=0 m=1
0 ν µ 0 ν µ
0 4.13E+06 2.62E+07 4.47E+07 4.13E+06 2.62E+07 4.47E+07
Nµν ν 2.64E+07 1.85E+08 3.14E+08 2.64E+07 1.85E+08 3.14E+08
µ 4.45E+07 3.14E+08 5.42E+08 4.45E+07 3.14E+08 5.42E+08
0 1 4 13 0 2 13
Mµν ν 3 10743 59590 2 10206 56841
µ 4 59339 340524 9 56775 323515
0 0 0 7 0 0 6
MBµν ν 1 2715 14937 1 2545 14330
µ 3 14778 85049 0 14320 81006
0 0 1 4 0 1 6
MCµν ν 1 2768 14839 1 2614 14215
µ 2 14990 84844 4 14108 80513
0 0 0 5 0 0 4
EBµνM
B
µν ν 0 13 61 0 10 83
µ 0 52 283 0 48 335
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ECµνM
C
µν ν 1 8 31 1 8 43
µ 1 58 188 3 53 212
9TABLE 4: List of the total pulses, the total counts and the error counts in the case of 51 km in the laboratory.
51km m=0 m=1
0 ν µ 0 ν µ
0 3.72E+07 2.35E+08 4.02E+08 3.72E+07 2.35E+08 4.02E+08
Nµν ν 2.37E+08 1.66E+09 2.82E+09 2.37E+08 1.66E+09 2.82E+09
µ 4.01E+08 2.82E+09 4.87E+09 4.01E+08 2.82E+09 4.87E+09
0 0 2 4 0 0 5
Mµν ν 0 10958 62904 1 11334 62323
µ 2 61726 359788 2 61619 356586
0 0 0 2 0 0 2
MBµν ν 0 2805 15806 0 2923 15695
µ 2 15312 89669 0 15506 89527
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MCµν ν 0 2835 15877 1 2818 15491
µ 0 15518 90300 0 15382 89748
0 0 0 1 0 0 1
EBµνM
B
µν ν 0 12 57 0 15 54
µ 0 70 372 0 59 294
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ECµνM
C
µν ν 0 9 44 0 8 30
µ 0 40 204 0 31 192
TABLE 5: List of the total pulses, the total counts and the error counts in the case of 76 km in the laboratory.
76km m=0 m=1
0 ν µ 0 ν µ
0 3.34E+08 2.12E+09 3.62E+09 3.34E+08 2.12E+09 3.62E+09
Nµν ν 2.13E+09 1.50E+10 2.54E+10 2.13E+09 1.50E+10 2.54E+10
µ 3.60E+09 2.54E+10 4.39E+10 3.60E+09 2.54E+10 4.39E+10
0 0 0 4 0 0 6
Mµν ν 2 10912 62070 1 10794 61148
µ 6 62252 363460 3 62362 360661
0 0 0 2 0 0 0
MBµν ν 1 2681 15491 1 2722 15346
µ 2 15781 91014 0 15670 90341
0 0 0 3 0 0 1
MCµν ν 0 2741 15779 0 2785 15198
µ 2 15716 91624 0 15543 90804
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
EBµνM
B
µν ν 0 14 50 0 12 44
µ 0 52 297 0 45 261
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ECµνM
C
µν ν 0 8 63 0 10 35
µ 1 45 272 0 60 265
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TABLE 6: List of the total pulses, the total counts and the error counts in the case of 102 km in the laboratory.
102km m=0 m=1
0 ν µ 0 ν µ
0 6.90E+09 4.37E+10 7.47E+10 6.90E+09 4.37E+10 7.47E+10
Nµν ν 4.41E+10 3.09E+11 5.24E+11 4.41E+10 3.09E+11 5.24E+11
µ 7.44E+10 5.24E+11 9.05E+11 7.44E+10 5.24E+11 9.05E+11
0 0 1 13 0 3 8
Mµν ν 1 21333 120069 1 22744 127079
µ 11 120257 698071 6 127284 740794
0 0 0 8 0 0 2
MBµν ν 0 5371 30050 1 5640 31713
µ 2 29996 175595 3 32088 186024
0 0 0 2 0 1 1
MCµν ν 0 5411 30174 1 5668 31701
µ 5 30267 175246 3 32217 185762
0 0 0 2 0 0 0
EBµνM
B
µν ν 0 31 182 0 34 127
µ 0 154 856 1 145 767
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ECµνM
C
µν ν 0 20 113 0 21 162
µ 2 147 799 0 140 820
TABLE 7: The counts and error rates of the random sampling.
Distance 25km 51km 76km 102km
Message m=0 m=1 m=0 m=1 m=0 m=1 m=0 m=1
Ms 137597 131162 145683 144388 146108 145195 281435 298206
Mr 321856 305969 338735 336140 341674 338976 656962 696951
MBs 34378 32689 36542 36247 36650 36634 70967 74697
MBr 80386 76967 84245 84481 85636 84723 164674 175128
MCs 34203 32660 36491 36226 36754 36529 70616 74828
MCr 80470 76176 85204 84395 86365 85016 165071 174852
EBs M
B
s 119 127 136 134 132 106 364 336
ECs M
C
s 90 95 90 80 110 94 297 300
